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EU COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT: IS BRUSSELS
I SUITED TO DEALING WITH ALL THE CHALLENGES?
MIHAIL DANOV*
Abstract There are arguments indicating that Brussels I could be applicable
to cross-border competition law proceedings before a National Competition
Authority located in one Member State and private EU competition law
proceedings before another Member State court. However, an analysis of the
current private international law framework appears to indicate that Brussels I
is not well suited to deal with the difficulties that could arise in this context.
Given the fact that, in the new proposal for a regulation on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments there is no indication that special
jurisdictional bases for competition law actions in the successor to Brussels I
are on anyone’s agenda, an option for a reform may be setting up a new and
special regulation to be applicable with regard to EU competition law claims
only.
I. INTRODUCTION
Regulation 1/2003 of the European Council replaced the centralized
enforcement system with a directly applicable exception system, in which the
national competition authorities and Member States’ courts have the power to
apply not only article 101(1) TFEU (ex article 81(1) TEC) and article 102
TFEU (ex article 82 TEC), which had been deemed to have direct effect
by virtue of the Court of Justice case law,1 but also article 101(3) TFEU
* Senior Lecturer in Law, Brunel University. This article is based on presentations made to the
SLS Conference 2010 in Southampton and the ‘Cross-border EU competition law actions’
workshop in Brunel University. The latter was organized in the context of a research project funded
by the European Commission Civil Justice Programme (JLS/2009/JCIV/AG/0034-30-CE-
0350182/00-68). The project, which also involves Prof Dr Jan Becker of Kiel University,
Germany as a research partner, aims to consider whether the European Union should use the
current EU private international law framework with regard to cross-border EU competition law
claims brought by private parties, or whether the EU legislator should instead create a Special
Regulation dealing with EU competition law proceedings arising in the European context. The
author is very grateful to the conference and workshop participants for their comments on earlier
versions of this article. This gratitude is extended to two anonymous reviewers for their very
helpful comments on an earlier draft and to my colleague Mr Stephen Dnes, who proofread draft
versions for me. The errors that remain are mine and mine alone.
1 Case 127/73 BRT v SABAM [1974] ECR 51, paras 14–16; Case C–282/95 P Guerin
Automobiles v Commission [1997] ECR I–1503, para 39; Case C–453/99 Courage Ltd v Crehan
[2001] ECR I–6297, para 23.
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(ex article 81(3) TEC).2 One of the important objectives of Regulation 1/2003
was to encourage private EU competition law enforcement in Europe. Articles
5 and 6 of the Regulation state that the National Competition Authorities
(NCAs) and national courts have the powers to apply articles 101 and 102
TFEU in individual cases. The regulation also provides for mechanisms to
ensure that ‘competition authorities of the Member States shall apply the [EU]
competition laws in close co-operation’.3 The Commission Notice on
cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities4 goes further,
preventing parallel proceedings relating to the same EU competition law
infringement and ensuring that those cases will be dealt with by an appropriate
competition authority.5 Articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 1/2003 are meant
to guarantee uniform and consistent application of EU competition law in
proceedings before the Commission and in cross-border EU competition law
proceedings before Member State courts.
However, Regulation 1/2003 does not deal with the problem of coherent and
uniform application of EU competition law in proceedings before an NCA
located in one Member State and private EU antitrust law proceedings related
to the same breaches of article 101 TFEU and/or article 102 TFEU before a
court in another Member State. Problems are bound to arise in such cases. On
the one hand, it is well established that an NCA may have the power to apply
articles 101 and 102 TFEU in cases where the markets in several Member
States have been affected.6 On the other hand, a Member State court may have
jurisdiction to hear and determine a claim regarding an EU competition law
infringement that has affected the markets in several countries, as well as
having jurisdiction to award damages in such cases.7 It has been submitted that
EU competition law proceedings before NCAs have no primacy over private
EU antitrust law proceedings before Member State courts and that the two
should be seen as independent.8 In view of that, potentially irreconcilable
2 See Recital 4 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on
the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003]
OJ L1/1.
3 Arts 11–14 of Council Regulation 1/2003. See further, S Brammer, Co-operation Between
National Competition Agencies in the Enforcement of EC Competition Law (Hart Publishing
2009).
4 Commission Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004]
OJ C101/43. 5 Brammer (n 3) 153–61.
6 See art 5 of Council Regulation 1/2003; Commission Notice (n 4) para 5. Parallel action by
two or three NCAs may be appropriate in some cases. In such a scenario, the authorities dealing
with the case may decide to designate one of them as a lead authority and to delegate some tasks to
that designated lead authority. See ibid paras 12–13. See also Brammer (n 3) 159.
7 See Provimi v Aventis Animal Nutrition [2003] EWHC 961 (Comm), [2003] ECC 29.
8 A Komninos, ‘Effect of Commission Decisions on Private Antitrust Litigation: Setting the
Story Straight’ (2007) 44 CMLRev 1387, 1426; A Komninos, ‘Relationship Between Public
and Private Enforcement: Quod Dei Deo, quod Caesaris Caesari’ (16th Annual EU Competition
Law and Policy Workshop—Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law:
Implications for Courts and Agencies, Florence, 17–18 June 2011) <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1870723> (a version of the latter paper will be published in P Lowe and M Marquis
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decisions on the same (or a related) EU competition law issue by an English
court and a foreign competition authority should be avoided. According to
Mario Monti, ‘multiple control and forum shopping before national courts
should be avoided. In this respect we can fortunately rely on the rules of
[Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in civil and commercial matters9 (Brussels I)].’10 This, however,
raises a fundamental question: is Brussels I applicable in the context of parallel
EU competition law proceedings brought before an NCA located in one
Member State and a court in another Member State?
Furthermore, given that Regulation 1/2003 provides for multiple enforcers
of EU competition law, some complex and important issues could arise at the
recognition and enforcement stage that may be of importance in follow-on EU
competition law actions brought before an English court following a foreign
NCA decision. Should an English court always follow a foreign NCA decision
finding an infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU? Could an English court
refuse the recognition and enforcement of a decision of a foreign competition
authority? A related question that should be considered is whether the English
courts could refuse the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment that
is in conflict with a decision of a UK competition authority or a decision of a
foreign competition authority.
Another closely linked question, which is bound to arise in this context, is
whether an English court can request a foreign competition authority to take
evidence for use in private EU competition law actions brought in England
(whether those actions be stand-alone or follow-on). Article 22(1) of
Regulation 1/2003 states that:
The competition authority of a Member State may in its own territory carry out
any inspection or other fact-finding measure under its national law on behalf and
for the account of the competition authority of another Member State in order to
establish whether there has been an infringement of Article [101] or Article [102]
of the TFEU.
This provision, however, makes no reference to requests made by national
courts. Furthermore, it has been submitted that ‘The weakness of Article 22(1)
of Regulation 1/2003 lies in the fact that it establishes only a right, not a
duty.’11 A better approach is adopted by the Evidence Regulation, which
(eds), European Competition Law Annual 2011: Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of
Competition Law: Implications for Courts and Agencies (Hart Publishing 2012) (forthcoming).
See also Case C–360/09 Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskartellamt [2011] 5 CMLR 219, Opinion of AG
Mazák, para 40.
9 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters [2001] OJ L12/1
(‘Brussels I’).
10 M Monti, ‘Competition Law Reform’ (CBI Conference on Competition Law Reform,
London, 12 June 2000) <http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2000_008_en.
html>. 11 Brammer (n 3) 82.
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appears to suggest that the requested NCA (if it were regarded as a ‘competent
court’ within the meaning of the Regulation) would be required to execute the
request made by the English court without delay.12 However, is the Evidence
Regulation even applicable in the context of cross-border EU competition law
actions?
The aim of this article is to consider whether the difficulties that could arise
in EU competition law proceedings before an NCA located in one Member
State and private proceedings related to the same infringement of article 101
and/or article 102 before another Member State court could be dealt with
under the current EU civil justice framework.13 More specifically, the article
will begin by attempting to indicate whether proceedings in which an NCA
seeks to establish an infringement of article 101 and/or article 102 could
be within the scope of Brussels I. Following this, the question of whether
a foreign competition authority could take evidence in support of private
EU competition law proceedings in England will be examined in the context
of the Evidence Regulation. The problem of avoiding parallel antitrust
proceedings before an NCA in one Member State and court proceedings
related to the same EU competition law infringement in another Member
State will then be examined under Brussels I. Finally, in the context of
Brussels I, the issue of the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
competition authority decision in England, as well as the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in conflict with a decision of the Office of
Fair Trading (OFT) finding an EU competition law infringement, will be duly
analysed.
II. BRUSSELS I AND THE EVIDENCE REGULATION—PROCEEDINGS BEFORE NATIONAL
COMPETITION AUTHORITIES
Given the fact that Regulation 1/2003 does not itself deal with the problems
of avoiding the risk of irreconcilable decisions related to the same EU
competition law infringement rendered by a court in one Member State and an
12 See art 10(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1206/2001 of 28 May 2001 on cooperation
between the courts of the member states in the taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters
[2001] OJ L174/1 (Evidence Regulation).
13 It seems that as a result of the enhanced private antitrust enforcement reform, private
international law has a vital role to play if EU competition rules are to be enforced effectively in
cross-border court proceedings. See M Danov, Jurisdiction and Judgments in Relation to EU
Competition Law Claims (Hart Publishing 2010). A conference entitled ‘International Antitrust
Litigation: Conflict of Laws and Coordination’ took place in Brussels (26 March 2010): for
information, see J Basedow, S Francq and L Idot (eds), International Antitrust Litigation: Conflict
of Laws and Coordination (Hart Publishing 2012) (forthcoming). The issue of the recognition of an
NCA decision in civil proceedings of another Member State was recently discussed by J Basedow,
‘Recognition of Foreign Decisions Within the European Competition Network’ in J Basedow,
J Philipp Terhechte and L Tichy, Private Enforcement of Competition Law (Nomos 2011) 169,
172–74, 176, 177.
30 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Nov 2013 IP address: 134.83.1.243
NCA located in another Member State,14 the aim of this sub-section is to
determine whether Brussels I and the Evidence Regulation could be helpful in
this context.
A. Scope of Brussels I
Article 1 of Brussels I states that the ‘Regulation shall apply in civil and
commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal’. Are EU
competition law claims within the scope of Brussels I? Although no definition
is given by the Regulation to the concept ‘civil and commercial matter,’ the
Court of Justice has clearly stated that the concept ‘civil and commercial
matter’ must be given an independent meaning in the light of ‘the objectives
and scheme of the [Regulation]’15 and ‘the general principles which stem
from the corpus of the national legal system’.16 The European Commission
has clearly stated that the Brussels I Regulation will be applicable to all
competition cases of a civil and commercial nature.17 A similar conclusion has
been reached by Professor Brozolo, who holds that there is no doubt that an EU
competition law claim falls within the scope of the term ‘civil and commercial
matter’.18 The deduction was explicitly confirmed by the English High Court
in SanDisk Corporation v Koninklijke Philips Electronics and others.19 Thus,
it is beyond doubt that an EU competition law claim brought before a Member
State court is properly regarded as a ‘civil and commercial matter’ for the
purposes of the Brussels I Regulation.
However, difficulties as to the scope of Brussels I are bound to arise because,
despite the fact that articles 101 and 102 TFEU regulate relationships between
private undertakings, EU competition law provisions may often be enforced
by NCAs in the public interest. Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 provides
that either administrative authorities20 or courts21 may be designated as NCAs
for the purposes of applying articles 101 and 102 TFEU in the different
Member States.22 Article 1 of the Brussels I Regulation, however, states that
14 Compare arts 13 and 15(3) of Regulation 1/2003.
15 Case 29/76 LTU v Eurocontrol [1976] ECR 1541. See also L Collins and others (eds),Dicey,
Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws (14th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2006) 314.
16 See Eurocontrol (n 15) para 5.
17 See Commission Notice on the Co-operation between the Commission and the Courts of the
EU Member States in the Application of Articles 81 and 82 [2004] OJ C101/04, 3. See also
Commission (EC), Damages Actions for Breach of EC Antitrust Rules (Green Paper) COM(2005)
672 final, para 2.8; Office of Fair Trading, ‘Response to the European Commission’s Green Paper,
Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules’ May 2006 OFT 844 <http://www.oft.gov.
uk/shared_oft/reports/oft_response_to_consultations/oft844.pdf>.
18 R di Brozolo, ‘Antitrust Claims: Why Exclude Them from The Hague Jurisdiction and
Judgment Convention’ (2004) 25 ECLR 780, 783.
19 [2007] EWHC 332 (Ch), [2007] Bus LR 705. See also Provimi (n 7).
20 eg in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Romania, the UK.
21 eg in Austria and Ireland.
22 eg Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Romania, the UK.
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‘[the Regulation] shall not extend, in particular, to . . . administrative matters’.
This raises the question of whether an NCA’s proceedings seeking to establish
an EU competition law infringement fall within the scope of Brussels I. The
problems as to the scope of Brussels I would arise particularly sharply in cases
where proceedings were brought before an NCA (which is an administrative
public authority) located in one Member State and private proceedings related
to the same infringement of article 101 and/or article 102 TFEU were brought
before the courts of another Member State. In both proceedings, the question as
to whether there is an EU competition law infringement should be determined
as a matter of EU substantive law. However, there would be an important
difference as far as the procedure is concerned. While a national court
would apply civil procedure rules that presuppose respect of due process, an
NCA would apply administrative procedure rules that could potentially raise
concerns as to the undertaking’s right to a fair trial and hearing.23 In view of
that, it would be very important to determine the scope of civil and commercial
matters and the scope of administrative matters in the context of Brussels I.24
This would be especially so in the context of decentralized EU competition law
enforcement, which may be privately enforced in proceedings before national
courts and publicly enforced in proceedings before NCAs.
In other words, the question is: does Brussels I apply in the context of EU
competition law proceedings before an NCA that seeks to establish an
infringement of article 101 and/or article 102 TFEU? A problem of definition
may arise because different Member States may have adopted different ‘models
of administrative adjudication’.25 For example, it is submitted that ‘the most
important characteristic of the French system of administrative adjudication is
the location of the administrative courts/tribunals within the executive
branch . . .’.26 The detail that such public bodies are not part of the judiciary,
when taken together with the fact that ‘the common features of administrative-
public enforcement are the verticality of the dispute, which remains one
between the state and private individuals . . .’,27 might lead some Member State
courts to adopt a narrow interpretation of Brussels I in cases where proceedings
seeking to establish an EU competition law infringement are brought before an
NCA that is an administrative public authority. In the same context, a broader
23 IS Forrester, ‘Due Process in EC Competition Cases: A Distinguished Institution with
Flawed Procedures’ (2009) 34 ELRev 817; J Killick and P Berghe, ‘This is Not the Time to Be
Tinkering with Regulation 1/2003—It is Time for Fundamental Reform—Europe Should Have
Change We Can Believe in’ (2010) Competition Law Review 259. The due process issue may
receive renewed attention after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. See art 6(1) TEU. See also
art 6(1) ECHR and art 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000]
OJ C364/1. See further, J Kuhling, ‘Fundamental Rights’ in A von Bogdandy and J Bast (eds),
Principles of European Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Hart Publishing 2010) 479–514; P Craig, The
Lisbon Treaty: Law, Politics and Treaty Reform (OUP, 2010) 193–245.
24 E Stroskrubb, Civil Procedure and EU Law: A Policy Area Uncovered (OUP 2008) 10.
25 See P Cane, Administrative Tribunals and Adjudication (OUP 2009). 26 ibid 89.
27 A Komninos, EC Private Antitrust Enforcement: Decentralised Application of EC
Competition Law by National Courts (Hart Publishing 2008) 6.
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interpretation may be adopted in other Member States. For example, ‘In the
UK model, . . . administrative tribunals are best understood . . . as species of
courts.’28 Thus, it seems that different Member States may have different views
as to whether proceedings seeking to establish an EU competition law
infringement before an NCA that is an administrative public authority are to be
regarded as falling within the scope of Brussels I. This result would be
unsatisfactory.
This clearly suggests that there is a need to adopt an autonomous definition
for the purposes of Brussels I. One might argue that a narrow definition should
be adopted and that proceedings seeking to establish an EU competition law
infringement before an NCA that employs administrative procedural rules
should not be within the scope of Brussels I. This deduction could be further
strengthened by pointing out that the Court of Justice has already held that ‘the
Epitropi Antagonismou [the Greek Competition Commission] is not a court or
tribunal within the meaning of Article 234 EC [now Article 267 TFEU]’.29 If
such reasoning were to be followed then an NCA that is an administrative
public authority should not be regarded as a court within the meaning of
Brussels I.
However, it should be noted that the provision of article 1 of Brussels I is
somewhat more widely drafted than article 267 TFEU, and there are strong
arguments suggesting that proceedings seeking to establish an EU competition
law infringement before an NCA that is an administrative public authority are
to be regarded as falling within the scope of Brussels I. It has been submitted
that Brussels I ‘also applies to civil or commercial matters brought before
administrative tribunals’.30 The Jenard31 and Schlosser32 reports seem to
suggest that the question as to which set of procedural rules (ie administrative
or civil) is applied does not arise when determining the scope of Brussels
I. Neither set is relevant if the action is between a public authority and a person
governed by the private law.33 A broader interpretation of the scope of Brussels
I has already been adopted by the Court of Justice34 in the context of article 1
of the Regulation. Therefore, in order to determine whether proceedings before
an NCA are to be regarded as falling within the scope of Brussels I an
important factor would be whether the designated authority, having ‘judicial
characteristics’,35 is exercising judicial functions in ‘civil and commercial
matter’.36 In this context, it should be noted that, despite the fact that articles
101 and 102 TFEU are meant to protect important public interests by
28 Cane (n 25) 72.
29 Case C–53/03 Synetairismos Farmakopion Aitolias & Akarnanis (Syfait) v GlaxoSmithKline
[2005] ECR I–4609, para 37. Compare Case C–67/91, Asociacion Espanola de Banca Privada
[1992] ECR I–4785.
30 Jenard Report OJ [1979] C59/1, 9; Schlosser Report OJ [1979] C59/71, para 23.
31 Jenard Report (n 30) 9. 32 Schlosser Report (n 30) para 23.
33 Eurocontrol (n 15) para 4. 34 ibid.
35 Synetairismos (n 29) Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 45.
36 Compare Eurocontrol (n 15) para 4.
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maintaining the process of competition, it is well established that ‘these
provisions regulate the behaviour of private undertakings’.37 If an EU
competition law claim brought before national courts in order to establish an
article 101/102 infringement is regarded as a ‘civil and commercial matter’ for
the purposes of Brussels I,38 then there is no reason to suggest that the matter
would be regarded differently only because the proceedings were brought
before an NCA that is an administrative body.
In other words, for the purposes of Brussels I, the question would not be
whether the action is pending before a court (or whether the action is pending
before an administrative body or what the applicable sets of procedural rules
are), but rather what is the subject matter of the proceedings and whether the
proceedings relate to civil and commercial matters. Therefore, article 1 of
Brussels I read together with the Jenard and Schlosser Reports leaves no doubt
that the context in which the proceedings before an NCA are brought would be
more important than the constitutional status of the public authority before
which the proceedings are brought. Following this line of reasoning it can be
argued that proceedings before NCAs should be regarded as within the scope
of Brussels I as long as an NCA is exercising judicial functions in civil and
commercial matters.
The test would not be satisfied and an NCA decision, or part of one,
imposing fines on an undertaking that has infringed articles 101 and 102
TFEU, would not be within the scope of Brussels I. This would be so because
in those proceedings an NCA could not be regarded as exercising judicial
functions in civil and commercial matters. Nevertheless, the test would be
satisfied and the proceedings would be within the scope of Brussels I if an
NCA seeks to determine whether an undertaking (or undertakings) committed
an infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Similarly, a decision (or part of
a decision) of an NCA that establishes an infringement of articles 101 and 102
TFEU should be within the scope of Brussels I. Such an interpretation would
be consistent with the fact that the EU legislator seems to consider the adoption
of a rule to the effect that a Member State court cannot take decisions running
counter to a final decision of an NCA finding an infringement of articles 101
and 102 TFEU.39
However, one might object to the deduction that an NCA final decision, or
part of one, establishing an infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU should
be within the scope of Brussels I by pointing out that the right to a fair trial of
an allegedly infringing undertaking might be undermined in the course of
proceedings before NCAs. In particular, article 6(1) ECHR states that ‘In the
determination of his civil rights and obligations . . ., everyone is entitled to a
37 A Albors-Llorens, ‘Consumer Law, Competition Law and the Europeanization of Private
Law’ in F Cafaggi (ed), The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (OUP 2006) 244,
260. 38 Section IIA above.
39 Commission (EC), Damages Actions for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (White Paper)
COM(2008) 165 final, para 2.3.
34 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
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fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.’ It is well established that article 6(1)
ECHR requires that, in the determination of civil rights and obligations,
decisions taken by administrative authorities should be subject to a judicial
body that has full jurisdiction.40 Similar requirements would have to be
satisfied with regard to decisions taken by NCAs.41 These requirements seem
to suggest that the recognition of an NCA decision (or part of a decision) would
potentially have to overcome a public policy defence that could be based on the
breach of the undertaking’s right to fair trial and hearing in administrative
proceedings.42 This might be particularly difficult in cases where such
decisions were taken by NCAs that are administrative bodies, combining the
functions of a party to competition law proceedings and a judge.43 In other
words, the fact that article 34(1) and (2) of Brussels I would allow for a national
court to refuse the recognition of a decision taken by an NCA that does not
respect due process rules in its adoption44 may be seen as just another
argument suggesting that an NCA final decision (or part of one) establishing an
infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU should be within the scope of
Brussels I. A broader interpretation of Brussels I would further uphold the
independence of national courts, safeguarding the defendant’s right to a fair
trial. This would be particularly important in view of the above-mentioned
proposal for the adoption of a rule to the effect that a Member State court
cannot take decisions running counter to a final decision of an NCA finding an
infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
B. Scope of the Evidence Regulation
The issue of taking evidence by a foreign NCA in support of private
proceedings in England could be very important in many cross-border EU
competition law actions. For example, it would be bound to arise in a follow-on
EU competition law action brought before an English court. This would be
particularly so if the decision of a Member State competition authority that
establishes an infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU were regarded as
being within the scope of Brussels I.45 The need for taking evidence by the
foreign competition authority in support of private proceedings in England
could arise because the NCA decision establishing that a foreign undertaking
40 Le Compte v Belgium (1982) 4 EHRR 1. See also WPJ Wils, Principles of European
Antitrust Enforcement (Hart Publishing 2005) 46–47; Forrester (n 23) 821.
41 Wils (n 40) 47; Forrester (n 23) 821.
42 Art 34(1) and (2) of Brussels I. The issue is further discussed in section IVA below.
43 Wils (n 40) 88.
44 See Case C–7/98 Krombach v Bamberski [2000] ECR I–1395. See also J Fawcett, ‘The
Impact of Article 6(1) of the ECHR on Private International Law’ (2007) 56 ICLQ 1; P Beaumont
and E Johnston, ‘Can Exequatur Be Abolished in Brussels I Whilst Retaining a Public Policy
Defence?’ (2010) 6 Journal of Private International Law 249.
45 See section IIIB below. See also Commission (EC), Damages Actions (n 39) para 2.3.
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had committed an EU competition law infringement would not have dealt
with such issues as, for example, whether a concrete claimant had suffered
damages and what damages should be awarded in order for a plaintiff to be
compensated. It has been recently stated by Lord Justice Jacob that:
the party claiming damages is not a party to the proceedings before the regulator.
Facts about causation and damages, which will normally include an investigation
into whether and if so how the infringing conduct affected that particular party,
are not necessarily a part of the regulator’s inquiry.46
In other words, despite the fact that a party could be relying on an infringement
decision taken by an NCA, evidence as to the causation and assessment of
damages would need to be collected in a follow-on action. This raises the
question of whether an English court could request evidence from the foreign
competition authority in support of private proceedings in England by relying
on the Evidence Regulation. Article 1 of the Evidence Regulation states that:
This Regulation shall apply in civil or commercial matters where the court of a
Member State, in accordance with the provisions of the law of the State, requests:
(a) the competent court of another Member State to take evidence; or (b) to take
evidence directly in another Member State.
Is an NCA to be regarded as a ‘competent court’ for the purposes of the
Evidence Regulation? As already mentioned, an NCA, as an administrative
public authority, is not a ‘court or tribunal’ within the meaning of article 267
TFEU.47 However, there are some strong reasons to suggest that a broader
interpretation of the term ‘competent court’ should be given under the
Evidence Regulation. First, the interpretation of the Evidence Regulation,
whose objective is ‘the improvement of cooperation between the courts on the
taking of evidence in civil or commercial matters’,48 should be consistent with
the interpretation of Brussels I.49 In view of that, it could be argued that NCAs
should be regarded as ‘competent courts’ for the purposes of the Evidence
Regulation because they are bodies exercising judicial functions in civil and
commercial matters. Indeed, as already mentioned, the White Paper on
damages seems to indicate that Member State courts should avoid taking
decisions running counter to a final decision of an NCA finding an
infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU.50
Secondly, ‘a specialised competition authority having judicial character-
istics’51 would be better placed to take evidence in EU competition law cases
46 Enron Coal Services Ltd (in liquidation) v English Welsh & Scottish Railway Ltd [2011]
EWCA Civ 2, [2011] UKCLR 303 [150].
47 Synetairismos (n 29) para 37. Compare Asociacion Espanola de Banca Privada (n 29).
48 Recital 5 of the Evidence Regulation.
49 See Proposal for a Council Directive on the service in the member states of judicial and
extrajudicial documents in civil and commercial matters COM(1999) 219 final 10. See also
Stroskrubb (n 24) 10. 50 Commission (EC), Damages Actions (n 39) para 2.3.
51 Synetairismos (n 29) Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 45.
36 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
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than a generalist Member State court. In this context, it should be pointed that
an NCA is already entitled to carry out any inspection or other fact-finding
measure under its national law on behalf and for the account of the competition
authority of another Member State.52 If competition authorities of Member
States were allowed to do so in the context of NCA proceedings seeking to
establish an EU competition law infringement, then a foreign competition
authority should be seen as a ‘competent court’ to take evidence in support of
cross-border EU competition law proceedings in the context of the Evidence
Regulation also.
Therefore, it can be argued that requests to foreign competition authorities
for taking evidence in support of private proceedings in England could be
made under the Evidence Regulation. One may, however, object to such a
deduction by saying that the use of evidence from the foreign competition
authority in support of private proceedings in England may undermine the
right to defence of the affected undertakings if evidence gathered by NCAs
that enjoy some intrusive powers may be used in the courts. Indeed, it has
been submitted that ‘there is a clear risk that information collected within the
context of particularly intrusive powers within a specific legal system with a
given set of checks and balances are “exported” and used in another legal
context’.53
Although it may be true that the NCAs enjoy intrusive powers, these powers
may be justified by the difficulties encountered in detecting cartels54 and the
importance for the EU internal market to provide for a system that ensures that
competition is not distorted.55 There seems to be a good balance between these
powers and the EU interests that they protect on the one hand, and the EU
policy to protect fundamental rights on the other. It is well established that all
NCAs must respect all procedural rights of the investigated undertakings in the
context of proceedings under articles 101 and 102 TFEU.56 This has been
clearly confirmed by the Court of Justice, which held that ‘the rights of defence
must be observed in administrative procedures which may lead to the
imposition of penalties’.57
Moreover, the rights of defence would be well protected if the evidence
collected by a foreign competition authority were used in the civil judicial
proceedings in which parties have the right to legal representation and enjoy
legal professional privilege. Such evidence would be used together with any
evidence collected in the course of the civil judicial proceedings in order for
52 See art 22 of Regulation 1/2003.
53 M Araujo, ‘The Respect of Fundamental Rights Within the European Network of
Competition Authorities’ in BE Hawk (ed), International Antitrust Law and Policy: Fordham
Corporate Law Institute: Annual Proceedings 2004 (Juris Publishing 2005) 511, 524–25.
54 ibid 512. 55 The TEU Protocol on the internal market and competition.
56 WPJ Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust Enforcement (Hart Publishing 2008)
20. See also art 6 TEU; Case C–292/97 Kjell Karlsson and Others [2000] ECR I–2760, para 37.
57 Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v Commission [1989] ECR 3137, para 26. See also Case 322/81
Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461, para 7.
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the court to determine whether there was infringing conduct and as to how the
infringing conduct affected a concrete claimant. Furthermore, any submission
that ‘the free circulation of evidence . . . may erode the fundamental rights’58
could not be supported in the context of requests made under the
Evidence Regulation. Article 1(2) of the Regulation leaves no doubt that
requests to a foreign competition authority for taking evidence in support of
private proceedings in England would only be used in the commenced
(or contemplated) civil judicial proceedings.59
Consequently, there are strong arguments indicating that Brussels I and the
Evidence Regulation could be applicable to cross-border competition law
proceedings before NCAs and private EU competition law proceedings before
courts. Such an approach with regard to the interpretation of the Evidence
Regulation and Brussels I would serve to avoid the risk of irreconcilable
decisions being handed down on the same antitrust issue in different Member
States. This poses the question: are these legal instruments suited to dealing
with such cross-border proceedings?
III. PARALLEL PROCEEDINGS—RISK OF IRRECONCILABLE DECISIONS
As already clarified, EU competition law proceedings before an NCA seeking
to establish an infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU should be regarded
as being within the scope of Brussels I.60 In other words, Brussels I should be
used to deal with the problem of parallel proceedings before an NCA located in
one Member State and private EU antitrust law proceedings related to the same
infringement in another Member State. This deduction could be further
strengthened by pointing out that a broad interpretation of Brussels I would
serve to avoid the inconsistency that would have followed if a complaint
against a decision of an NCA constituted as an administrative authority had
been lodged and if those proceedings were pending before national courts.
(For example, in the case of the UK such a complaint against a decision finding
an EU competition law infringement could be brought before the Competition
Appeal Tribunal (CAT).61 Decisions of the CAT could be further appealed
before the Court of Appeal. In so far as the Competition Act does not provide
for an appeal, there remains the possibility that a claim for judicial review may
be brought before the Administrative Court of the Queen’s Bench Division
under part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules.)
58 Araujo (n 53) 530. 59 See art 1(2) of the Evidence Regulation.
60 See section IIA above. See also Danov (n 13) 184–86; Eurocontrol (n 15) paras 4–5.
61 See sections 46 and 47 of the Competition Act 1998. The 1998 Act goes further and lists the
‘appealable decisions’. Schedule 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002 permits most decisions of the CAT to
be enforceable by registration at the High Court in England and Wales. By virtue of those
provisions, the decision becomes enforceable in the same way as a judgment of the High Court. See
also R Whish, Competition Law (6th edn, OUP 2008) 426–36; section IV below.
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That said, it should be noted that articles 27 and 28 of Brussels I are
‘intended to prevent parallel proceedings before the courts of different
[Member States] and to avoid conflicts between decisions which might result
therefrom’.62 Are the provisions in question adequate to avoid the problem of
parallel proceedings in a situation where a claim (or counter-claim) that a
contract (or contracts) violates EU competition law is brought before an
English court and a complaint is lodged before a foreign NCA?
A. Staying the Proceedings—lis pendens Actions
Article 27(1) of Brussels I states that:
Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same
parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court other than
the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as
the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established . . .
This provision is intended to deal with the problem of lis pendens.63 The effect
of article 27 of Brussels I is that any court other than the court first seised must,
depending on the circumstances, either stay its proceedings or decline
jurisdiction. One condition that could cause particular problems in connection
with antitrust claims is to do with the requirement that ‘proceedings [are] to be
brought before the courts of different Member States’. It should be noted that
the Court of Justice has held that article 27 requires the parallel proceedings to
involve three elements: the proceedings must have the same subject matter
(or the same object), the same cause of action and the same parties.64 In view of
that, it seems that the phrase ‘same cause of action’ in article 27 should be
regarded as a European concept that is not to be interpreted according to the
criteria of national law.65 There are two tests that have to be satisfied in this
respect. First, do the actions have as their basis the same facts and rule of
law?66 Secondly, do these actions have the same object (ie do the claims in the
parallel proceedings seek to achieve the same outcome)?67 Briggs and Rees
suggest that another way of testing the matter is to ask ‘whether a decision in
62 Case 144/86 Gubisch Maschinen-fabrik v Palumbo [1987] ECR 4861, para 8.
63 ‘A pending lawsuit’ (Latin). See also C McLachlan, Lis Pendens in International Litigation
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2009) 23. 64 Gubisch (n 62) para 14.
65 A Briggs and P Rees, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgements (5th edn, Informa 2009) 314;
J Fawcett and JM Carruthers (eds), Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law (14th
edn, OUP 2008) 305. See also Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance v MK Digital FZE (Cyprus) [2005]
EWHC 1408 (Comm) ILPr 51 (QBD (Comm)), para 66 (reversed without reference to this point),
[2006] EWCA Civ 629, [2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 110 (CA).
66 Case C–406/92 Tatry [1994] ECR I–5439, para 39; Case C–39/02 Mærsk Olie & Gas A/S v
Firma M de Haan en W de Boer [2004] ECR I–9657, para 38 (Court of Justice, Third Chamber).
67 Tatry (n 66) paras 41–43; Case C–111/01 Gantner Electronic GmbH v Basch Exploitatie
Maatschappij BV [2003] ECR I–4207, para 25 (Court of Justice, Fifth Chamber). See also Gubisch
(n 62); Case C–351/89Overseas Union Insurance Ltd v New Hampshire Insurance Co [1991] ECR
I–3317. See further, Cheshire, North & Fawcett (n 65) 305–10; Briggs and Rees (n 65) 314–16.
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the one set of proceedings would have been a conclusive answer to the
question raised in the other’.68
The ‘cause of action’ requirement for the purposes of article 27 would
obviously be met in the situation where both sets of proceedings are for nullity
of a contract that is in conflict with EU competition law. But what if a
complaint is lodged before the French Competition Authority (the Conseil de
la Concurrence) by a company X that is party to a contract with a dominant
undertaking Y, and subsequently Y brings proceedings for enforcement of the
same contract in England, where a defence of nullity is raised by X, together
with a counter-claim for damages? In such a scenario, there would be
proceedings for enforcement of a contract in England, where a defence of
nullity was raised together with a counter-claim for damages; and another set
of proceedings before the French competition authority that were brought to
put an end to an EU antitrust law infringement resulting from the
implementation of the same contract in France and England.
Would article 27 be helpful in such a scenario (assuming that the NCA,
being a body exercising judicial functions, were to be regarded as a ‘court’ for
present purposes and that it applied the Brussels I Regulation)? It seems that it
would be impracticable for an English court to try the validity of the contract
issue until the French national authority had ruled on the EU competition law
infringement issue. Before a hearing determining whether the contract was
valid under article 101 and/or article 102 TFEU, the English court could
determine neither whether the contract should be performed nor whether there
were an antitrust damages claim. However, it seems that the conditions of
article 27 of Brussels I would not easily be satisfied. The Court of Justice has
held that:
in order to determine whether there is lis pendens in relation to two disputes,
account cannot be taken of the defence submissions, whatever their nature, and in
particular of defence submissions alleging set-off, on which a defendant might
subsequently rely when the court is definitively seised in accordance with its
national law . . .69
This ruling, however, has been made in respect of defence submissions and a
set-off defence in particular. This can be justified by the fact that such a defence
could not result in a separate judgment. A counter-claim70 that a contract
(or part of a contract) was void as being in conflict with articles 101 and 102
TFEU would indicate that the court should make a separate judgment as to
whether there were an antitrust law infringement that might result in
inconsistent application of EU competition law and might potentially run
counter to the decision of a foreign NCA, so that it could be argued that an
68 Briggs and Rees (n 65) 315. 69 Gantner Electronic (n 67) para 31.
70 Case C–341/93 Danvaern Production A/S v Schuhfabriken Otterbeck GmbH & Co [1995]
ECR I–2053.
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English court would have to stay its proceedings in relation to the EU
competition law claim.
However, even if Gantner Electronic were distinguished and the submission
that the contract was in conflict with EU competition law were taken into
account in order to determine whether there was lis pendens between the two
disputes, the English courts would not be precluded under article 27 of
Brussels I from trying to enforce the contract claim. The latter claim could
be seen as related to EU competition law proceedings for the purposes of
article 28, but the actions would not be identical within the meaning of
article 27. Furthermore, nor would the ‘same parties’ requirement of article 27
of Brussels I be satisfied. Company X that lodged the complaint before the
French Competition Authority would not be not party to the administrative
proceedings in France, which would be conducted between the foreign NCA
and the dominant undertaking Y.71
B. Staying the Proceedings—Related Actions
Article 28 of Brussels I states that ‘where related actions are pending in the
courts of different Member States, any court other than the court first seised
may stay its proceedings’, and it is designed to deal with those situations that
do not fall within the strict confines of article 27 of the Regulation. In other
words, if EU competition law actions are not identical within the meaning of
article 27, but are related, then article 28 may be applied. Article 28 of has to
do with a situation where related actions are pending in the courts of different
Member States. The court second seised may, as a matter of discretion, stay its
proceedings. Article 28(2) goes further and gives an additional discretion to the
court. Based on that provision, the court may decide to decline jurisdiction
as opposed to merely staying its proceedings if the court first seised has
jurisdiction over the actions in question and its law permits the consolidation
thereof. It should be clearly outlined, however, that this is not a forum
conveniens discretion: ‘[T]he question: “which court would be the more
convenient or the more appropriate?” does not arise’.72 A stay should be
granted simply in order to avoid irreconcilable decisions.
The latter provision contains no requirement about the same cause of action
or same parties in the two proceedings. The only question that needs to be
answered affirmatively in order for a Member State court to rely on article 28
is whether the two actions are related. The answer to this question should be
provided in a broad common sense manner, bearing in mind the objective of
article 28, namely to improve coordination of the exercise of judicial functions
within the EU and to avoid conflicting and contradictory decisions,73 thus
71 See Enron (n 46) para 150.
72 The ‘Linda.’ [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 175 (QBD (Admlty)) 179 (per Sheen J).
73 ibid paras 32, 52.
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facilitating the proper administration of justice in the EU74 and the coherent
and uniform application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU.
In the context of EU competition law claims, the court should determine two
issues: are the antitrust actions related; if so, should the court exercise its
discretionary power? In order to answer the question of whether the actions are
related two factors should be considered. The first, and major factor, is the
degree of risk of irreconcilable decisions. It has been submitted that the risk of
irreconcilable judgments applies just as much to the risk of inconsistent
findings of fact as it does to the risk of inconsistent findings of law.75 In the
Provimi case, the English court clearly outlined that different views of national
courts may be a reason for hearing EU competition law claims together in order
to avoid irreconcilable judgments.76 The court went further and held that, even
though the law on competition in European countries is very similar, ‘it is
highly arguable that different courts would take different approaches to these
issues and those different approaches could result in irreconcilable judg-
ments’.77 It is beyond doubt that there is a risk of irreconcilable decisions if a
cartel agreement (or abusive practice) has been implemented in two different
States and an action related to that agreement or practice is pending in one
Member State while an NCA located in another Member State has started to
investigate the matter in respect of the same agreement or practice. A finding
that there is an EU competition law infringement and that a contract is void
under articles 101 and 102 TFEU would be irreconcilable with a finding that
the contract should be enforced. The second factor is that the court should
determine whether it is expedient to hear and determine the two actions
together, so that they could be regarded as related for the purposes of article 28
of Brussels I. It seems that no particular difficulties in competition cases could
arise out of this requirement. However, one major problem relates to the fact
that the current version of the Brussels I Regulation appears to assume that the
court or NCA first seised is always an appropriate forum. Indeed, articles 27
and 28 always give priority to the court first seised.78 Accordingly, a plaintiff
who intends to delay settlement of a future substantive antitrust law dispute
may deliberately commence pre-emptive proceedings before a court that is not
well placed to deal with an EU competition law case or has no jurisdiction.79
This is not a satisfactory outcome as it could result in delay.
74 Sarrio v Kuwait Investment Authority [1999] 1 AC 32 (HL) 39 (per Lord Saville). See also
A Briggs, ‘Private International Law’ (1997) 68 British YBIntlL 331, 339–42; J Harris, ‘Related
Actions and the Brussels Convention’ (1998) Llyods Martime and Commercial Law Quarterly 145.
75 Gascoine v Pyrah [1994] ILPr 82 (CA), para 44; See also ET Plus SA v Welter [2005]
EWHC 2115 (Comm), [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 215, para 59. 76 See Provimi (n 7) [47].
77 ibid [45]–[46]. See further, Danov (n 13) 51–54.
78 PE Herzog, ‘Brussels and Lugano, Should You Race to the Courthouse or Race for a
Judgment?’ (1995) 43 AmJCompL 379, 381–84.
79 Case C–116/02 Erich Gasser v MISAT [2003] ECR I–14693, Opinion of AG Philip Leger
para 68. Compare Cooper Tire & Rubber Company Europe Ltd v Dow Deutschland Inc [2010]
EWCACiv 864, [2010] 2 CLC 104. See also TC Hartley, ‘The European Union and the Systematic
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Furthermore, it may often be the case that the court (or NCA) first seised is
not well placed to hear and determine an EU competition law case because an
anti-competitive agreement or practice that has been implemented in a number
of Member States does not affect the market in the Member State where the
action is brought. It is unfortunate that jurisdiction in such cases would depend
on the question of who is faster in lodging his claim. A more satisfactory result
would have been reached if the court (or NCA) first seised had been entitled to
decline jurisdiction in cases where agreement or practices have no substantial
direct effects (whether actual or foreseeable) on competition within the Member
State.80 However, particular difficulties could arise in cases where competition
law proceedings were brought before a foreign NCA and private proceedings
with respect to the same infringement were brought before an English court.
Even if NCAs (being bodies exercising judicial functions in civil and
commercial matters) were regarded as ‘courts’ within the meaning of article 28
of Brussels I, the question would remain whether NCAs should exercise their
discretion to stay their proceedings or indeed decline jurisdiction. In some
cases, such discretion could well be exercised as long as the allegedly anti-
competitive practice had affected the competition within the market where the
court seised was located, which would make such a court well placed to hear
and determine an EU competition law claim. This can be justified by two main
arguments.
First, as already indicated,81 a judicial decision presupposes respect of the
right to fair trial and hearing, something that is far from guaranteed in respect to
decisions taken by NCAs, which are administrative bodies combining the
function of a party to competition law proceedings and a judge. If decisions of
such NCAs are considered to be compatible with article 6(1) ECHR only if
subject to full review by a judicial body meeting, then it can be argued that the
right to fair trial would only be guaranteed if the court had actually reviewed
the decision.82 Following this line of reasoning, one could go a step further and
say that an NCA should normally exercise its discretion and stay its
proceedings in favour of the court seised with the related EU competition law
dispute because the court would be able to guarantee adversarial proceedings.
This deduction can be further strengthened by noting that the independence of
NCAs can be questioned. In particular, it has been submitted that
the obligation for the competition authorities to consult the Commission provided
for in Article 11(4) of [Regulation 1/2003] together with the Commission’s power
pursuant to Article 11(6) of [Regulation 1/2003] to withdraw the case from the
national competition authorities . . . thus raises a problem under Article 6
ECHR.83
Dismantling of the Common Law of Conflict of Laws’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 813; P de Vareilles-
Sommieres (ed), Forum Shopping in the European Judicial Area (Hart Publishing 2007).
80 Compare the approach in respect of allocation of cases between the NCAs. See Commission
Notice (n 4) para 8. 81 Section IIA above. 82 Wils (n 40) 89. 83 Wils (n 40) 90.
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This is in sharp contrast with article 15 of Regulation 1/2003, which is meant to
safeguard the independence of national courts and the right to fair trial and
hearing, by providing for a ‘soft’ form of cooperation between the Commission
and Member State courts. These are especially important considerations
following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty.84
Secondly, the submission that an NCA should normally exercise its dis-
cretion and stay its proceedings in favour of the court seised with the related
EU competition law dispute can be further justified by pointing out that
national courts would be able to establish that there was an infringement of
articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as well as being entitled to award damages85 that
would rectify the harm caused by the breach of EU competition law.86 In other
words, the fact that ‘[p]rivate actions ensure compensation for those harmed by
anti-competitive conduct’87 may be seen by NCAs as an important factor in
favour of staying their proceedings or declining jurisdiction. Therefore, in
many cases, the national courts may be better suited than the Member States’
NCAs to establish an infringement of EU competition law. The possibility for
an NCA to stay its proceedings would raise the question whether the foreign
NCA in question could be relied upon to take evidence in support of private
proceedings in England. It has already been noted that requests to foreign
competition authorities for taking evidence in support of private proceedings in
England could be made under the Evidence Regulation.88 Nevertheless, this
would be an important issue, which indicates that if the Commission wishes to
create mechanisms to improve the legal conditions for EU antitrust claimants
to get full compensation for suffered damages89 as well as to promote the right
to defence of allegedly infringing undertakings further, then it might consider a
Notice on the cooperation between NCAs and Member State courts. Such a
Notice might clearly outline that an NCA can carry out any inspection or other
fact-finding measure under its national law on the request of a court of another
Member State. This would be an important legislative development, which
would have significant implications for cases in which an NCA decides to stay
its proceedings in favour of a court seised with a related EU competition law
dispute.
In other cases, however, the various leniency programmes adopted by the
Member States competition authorities90 may be seen as a strong factor
suggesting that, in some cases, an NCA may decide not to stay their
proceedings (or decline jurisdiction). Indeed, it could be argued that in some
84 See art 6(1) TEU. See also: art 6(1) ECHR and art 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/1.
85 Commission StaffWorking Paper, Annex to the Green Paper, Damages Actions for Breach
of the EC Antitrust Rules SEC(2005) 1732, para 8.
86 J Basedow (ed), Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law (Kluwer 2007) 1–2;
Komninos (n 27) 7–8. 87 Komninos (n 27) 8. 88 See section IIB above.
89 Commission (EC), Damages Actions (n 39) para 1.2.
90 See U Boge, ‘Leniency programs and the private enforcement of European competition law’
in Basedow (n 86) 217, 218.
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cases the competition authorities’ leniency programmes would provide
stronger incentives for infringing undertakings to cooperate in order for a
breach of EU competition law to be established, so that an English court might
decide to stay its proceedings and await the decision of a foreign NCA that
might be better placed to deal with the case. Accordingly, there may well be
cases in which the NCAs would be better suited than the national courts to
establish an infringement of EU competition law.
Although in some cases it could be more appropriate for a Member State
court to be given a discretionary power to stay their proceedings in favour of a
foreign NCA that could be more appropriate or better placed to determine
whether there was infringement of EU competition law, this would raise the
question of the recognition and enforcement of a foreign NCA decision in
England. The White Paper on modernisation seems to indicate that an NCA
decision is enforceable only within the territory on which the authority in
question operates.91 The issue of the recognition and enforcement of decisions
taken by NCAs is left out of Regulation 1/2003.92 Nevertheless, there are
strong arguments suggesting that a foreign NCA decision could be recognized
by the OFT or another NCA if a request were made by the Member State that
adopted the decision.93 But would they be recognized by the courts in the
context of cross-border private antitrust proceedings? Can NCA decisions be
recognized and enforced under Brussels I? Are decisions of NCAs within the
scope of the Brussels I Regulation?
IV. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT UNDER BRUSSELS I
As already mentioned, the EU legislator seems to have considered the adoption
of a rule to the effect that a Member State court cannot take decisions running
counter to a final decision of an NCA in the ECN finding an infringement of
articles 101 and 102 TFEU.94 Are the decisions of NCAs to be regarded as
‘judgments’ for the recognition and enforcement purposes? Could an English
court refuse the recognition and enforcement of a judgment that is in conflict
with a decision of an NCA?
91 White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC
Treaty, Commission Programme No 99/027, para 60. See Komninos (n 27) 77; Brammer (n 3)
426–36.
92 It has been submitted that ‘Article 10 EC [now Article 4(3) TEU], while not requiring
Member States to automatically and mutually recognise the legal force of all decisions which are
adopted to implement Article 81 or 82 EC [now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU], can certainly be
construed in such a way as to impose a duty on Member States to recognise the validity of foreign
NCA decision on a case-by-case basis. This means that recognition would take place only when a
request is made by the Member State which adopted the decision and only by the NCA of the
Member State to which the request is submitted’ (Brammer (n 3) 428–29). Even if this
interpretation were correct, the effect of such recognition would be somewhat limited, as the foreign
NCA would only be recognized by the local NCA being part of the same ECN.
93 ibid. 94 Commission (EC), Damages Actions (n 39) para 2.3.
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A. Recognition and Enforcement in England of Foreign NCAs’ Decisions
Decisions of NCAs are given in the context of administrative public
proceedings in which NCAs enjoy extensive investigative and decision-
making powers.95 Although one might say that decisions of public authorities
do not produce res judicata effect, it should be pointed out that such decisions
do enjoy finality.96 Indeed, it is well established that a res judicata effect is not
a pre-condition for the purposes of recognition under the Brussels I Regulation
as the words ‘res judicata’ have been deliberately omitted by the EU legislator
from the text of the Regulation.97 However, are foreign NCA decisions to
be regarded a ‘judgments’ for the purposes of article 32 of the Brussels I
Regulation? One of the main requirements for recognition and enforcement
purposes is that the judgment must be given by a court or tribunal of a Member
State. The Court of Justice has also firmly held that to be classified as a
judgment the decision must emanate from a judicial body of a Member State.98
Are the NCAs judicial bodies? Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 provides that
Member States are to designate the competition authorities responsible for
the application of articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Article 35(2) makes clear
that designated authorities may include judicial authorities.99 Most Member
States, however, have designated an administrative, rather than a judicial, body
because most follow the EU scheme of having an administrative body
investigating and deciding cases.100 Clearly, the requirement that ‘a decision
[is] to emanate from a judicial body of a Member State’ will not be met where
the task of applying articles 101 and 102 TFEU is entrusted to administrative
authorities. For example, one might think that decisions of the OFT (being an
independent government department and administrative body) would not
qualify as a ‘judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction’.101 A different
result for the purposes of the Brussels I Regulation can be reached with respect
to NCAs’ decisions adopted in countries102 where the judicial bodies are
designated as NCAs.103 Such a different outcome could be explained by the
fact that the decisions of NCAs that are judicial bodies may be regarded as
judgments within the meaning of article 32 of Brussels I.
95 Komninos (n 27) 119.
96 X Groussot and T Minssen, ‘Res Judicata in the Court of Justice Case-law: Balancing Legal
Certainty with Legality?’ (2007) 3 European Constitutional Law Review 385.
97 Jenard Report (n 30) 43.
98 Case C–414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren v Boch [1994] ECR I–2237, para 17. Compare Jenard
Report (n 30) 42. See also Schlosser Report (n 30) para 23.
99 See Joined cases 209–213/84 Ministere Public v Lucase Asjes [1986] ECR 1425, para 55.
See also BRT (n 1) 1. 100 eg Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, Italy, Romania, the UK.
101 Compare The Sennar (No 2) [1985] 1 WLR 490 (HL) [499].
102 eg Austria and Ireland. In other countries, the task of applying arts 81 and 82 is entrusted to
quasi-judicial bodies, which are only from an organizational point of view part of the NCA
(eg Germany).
103 See D Cahill, JD Cooke and W Wils (eds) The Modernisation of EU Competition Law
Enforcement: FIDE 2004 National Reports (CUP 2004). See also C Kerse and N Khan, EC
Antitrust Procedure (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 260.
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In view of the above, a better approach is to hold that a decision of an NCA
would be within the scope of the Regulation as long as it related to a civil or
commercial matter. It has already been concluded that proceedings before
NCAs should be regarded as within the scope of Brussels I as long as an NCA
is exercising judicial functions in civil and commercial matters. As already
noted,104 this would mean that a decision (or part of a decision) of an NCA that
imposes fines on an undertaking that has infringed articles 101 and 102 TFEU
would not be within the scope of Brussels I.105 However, a decision (or part of
a decision) of an NCA that establishes an infringement of articles 101 and
102 TFEU should be within the scope of Brussels I.106 Indeed, if an EU
competition law claim brought before national courts in order to establish an
EU competition law infringement is regarded as a ‘civil and commercial
matter’ for the purposes of Brussels I, then there is no reason to suggest that
the matter would be regarded differently simply because the proceedings
were brought before an NCA that is an administrative body.107 Such an
interpretation would be in line with article 1 of Brussels I which seems to
suggest that ‘judgments given in a [Member] State in civil commercial matters
by . . . administrative tribunals must be recognized and enforced in the other
[Member] States’.108 A broader interpretation of article 32 of Brussels I would
lead to achieving uniform results as to the recognition and enforcement of all
NCAs’ decisions under Brussels I.
The need for a broader interpretation can be further strengthened by pointing
out that even though a decision made by the OFT might not be regarded
as a judgment within the meaning of article 32 of Brussels I, a different
interpretation could be made for the purposes of Brussels I if an appeal were
made in respect of the OFT. For example, schedule 4 of the 2002 Act permits
most decisions of the CAT to be enforceable by registration at the High Court
in England and Wales (and by a corresponding procedure in Scotland and
Northern Ireland). Through these provisions, the decision becomes enforceable
in the same way as a judgment of the High Court. Decisions of the CAT
could be further appealed before the Court of Appeal or Court of Session
respectively.109 There is no doubt that in the latter case the judgment of the
Court of Appeal would preclude recognition and enforcement of the foreign
judgment in England. Thus, it seems that if a complaint against a decision of
the OFT has been lodged, then in some cases the judgment rendered at the
appeal could be regarded as a judgment. If no appeal against a decision of the
OFT has been made, however, this would not be regarded as a judgment
within the meaning of Brussels I. The different results are due to the different
constitutional positions of a court, on the one hand, and other public
104 See section IIA above. 105 Eurocontrol (n 15) paras 4–5. 106 ibid para 4.
107 See section IIA above.
108 Jenard Report (n 30) 42. See also Schlosser Report (n 30) para 23.
109 See section 49 of the Competition Act 1998.
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authorities, on the other. Nonetheless, it appears that this outcome would not
be desirable.
The importance of a broader interpretation of article 32 of Brussels I in the
context of cross-border EU competition law proceedings can find further
support in the EU legislator’s proposal in the White Paper on damages.110
However, as already noted,111 a broader interpretation would suggest that the
recognition of an NCA decision (or part of a decision) would often have to
overcome a public policy defence that could be based on the breach of the
undertaking’s right to fair trial and hearing in administrative proceedings.112
The recognition would be particularly difficult in cases where the decision was
taken by an NCA that is an administrative body, combining the function of a
party to competition law proceedings and a judge.113 Such NCA proceedings
could undermine the right to a fair trial and hearing and the rendered NCA
decision could raise ‘due process’ concerns.
A general principle of EU law is that everyone is entitled to a fair trial and
hearing,114 which is indeed a fundamental human right.115 It is well established
that a manifest breach of a fundamental human right would trigger the
public policy defence under Brussels I.116 In determining whether an NCA’s
proceedings safeguard the infringing undertaking’s right to a fair trial and
hearing, the recognizing court should be guided by the case law of the
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). As already submitted, the ECtHR
requires that, in the determination of civil rights and obligations, decisions
taken by administrative authorities should be subject to a judicial body that has
full jurisdiction.117 In other words, if a decision taken by an NCA were not
reviewed by a court with full jurisdiction, then it could be argued that the right
to fair trial of an infringing undertaking would be undermined118 and hence
that recourse to the public policy defence under Brussels I would be
possible.119 Although the European Commission has proposed the abolition
of exequatur,120 it seems that there will be safeguards that may be triggered if
the right to fair trial of the defendant is undermined. The importance of such
safeguards has been noted by Beaumont and Johnston, who have argued that
‘Human rights are deemed a major part of the public policy exception and thus
if exequatur proceedings were abandoned totally without any safeguard, this
110 Commission (EC), Damages Actions (n 39) para 2.3. 111 See section IIA above.
112 Art 34(1) and (2) of Brussels I. See also Krombach (n 44) para 43; Fawcett (n 44) 25;
Beaumont and Johnston (n 44) 253–54. 113 Wils (n 40) 88. 114 Krombach (n 44) para 26.
115 See 47(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights; art 6(1) ECHR.
116 Krombach (n 44) paras 39–45.
117 Le Compte v Belgium (1982) 4 EHRR 1. See also: Wils (n 40) 46-47; Forrester (n 23) 821.
118 Wils (n 40) 89. 119 Krombach (n 44) para 42.
120 Art 38 of the Proposal for a Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters COM(2010) 748/3 (Brussels I Proposal). See
further, ibid 5–8.
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would in effect prioritise free movement of judgments over fundamental rights,
in particular the right to a fair trial.’121 This is certainly a valid argument in
the context of cross-border EU competition law proceedings, which may
often involve NCAs. Accordingly, in a recently published amendment
proposal, the EU Commission has stated that ‘The abolition of exequatur will
be accompanied by procedural safeguards which ensure that the defendant’s
right to a fair trial and his rights of defence as guaranteed in Article 47 of the
EU Charter on Fundamental Rights are adequately protected.’122
It therefore seems clear that a broader interpretation of article 32 of Brussels
I in the context of cross-border EU competition law proceedings would provide
for safeguards ensuring that decisions of foreign NCAs would freely circulate
within the EU only if the NCAs’ proceedings respected the right to a fair trial
and hearing of the infringing undertakings. A broader interpretation of
article 32 of Brussels I would further uphold the independence of Member
State courts, which would be entitled to deny the recognition of a decision
taken by a foreign NCA whose proceedings did not respect the right to a fair
trial and hearing of the defendant. Nevertheless, the difficulties arising in this
context might suggest that the EU legislator would consider the adoption of
a new legislative instrument that would promote free circulation of decisions
in relation to EU competition law further safeguarding the defendant’s right
to a fair trial, as well as upholding the independence of Member State courts
vis-à-vis NCAs.
B. Recognition and Enforcement of a Member State Court’s Judgment that
is Irreconcilable with an NCA Decision123
The main issues that will be addressed in this sub-section relate to the question
of whether the recognizing court would be entitled to refuse recognition of a
judgment that is in conflict with the decision of an NCA. Article 34(3) of
Brussels I provides that a judgment given by the courts of a Member State shall
be refused recognition if it conflicts with a judgment124 given in a dispute
between the same parties125 in the state in which recognition is sought. Thus, a
judgment in relation to an EU competition law claim that has been given in the
State in which enforcement is sought would operate as a defence against the
recognition of a foreign judgment in relation to that claim. Article 34(4) of
121 Beaumont and Johnston (n 44) 253.
122 See the Brussels I Proposal 6. See also ibid Recitals 24, 27.
123 Danov (n 13) 200–04.
124 It should be determined whether those judgments entail legal consequences that are mutually
exclusive. See Case 145/86 Hoffmann v Krieg [1988] ECR 645, para 22.
125 Section IIIA above. See also Danov (n 13) 124–27.
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Brussels I goes further and provides that a judgment given by the court of a
Member State shall be refused recognition
if the judgment is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another
Member State or in a third state involving the same cause of action and between
the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions
necessary for its recognition in the Member State addressed.
These requirements cannot be met in the situation where a foreign judgment
is contrary to a decision rendered by an NCA. Even if it is assumed that a
decision taken by an NCA is to be regarded as judgment, one should not forget
that parties to the proceedings before the competition authority are the NCA in
question and the allegedly infringing undertaking(s), so that the ‘same parties’
requirement of article 34(3) and (4) would not be satisfied.126
Nevertheless, can the English courts refuse the recognition of a judgment
that is in conflict with a decision of an NCA on the ground of public policy? It
is well established that recognition of a foreign judgment cannot be refused on
the ground of public policy where EU competition law was misapplied by an
adjudicating court.127 A different outcome may be reached, however, in cases
where that very judgment is in conflict with a decision of the Commission.
Such a result can be deduced from the principle of sincere cooperation as
reflected in article 4(3) TEU. In view of this provision, it has been held that
national courts must exercise their powers to avoid the risk of judgments
that are in conflict with Commission decisions.128 The duty of national
courts to avoid such risk was upheld by the Court of Justice in two leading
cases: Delimitis129 and Masterfoods.130 This was reinforced by article 16 of
Regulation 1/2003, which binds national courts to take every effort to avoid
judgments conflicting with decisions which have been (or are about to be) the
subject of a Commission decision.131 Thus, public policy may be used to
deal with an objection that does not fall within the scope of other defences
of recognition132 and the recognizing court would be entitled to refuse
recognition of a judgment that is in conflict with an infringement decision
of the Commission. Indeed, arguments suggesting that the English courts
have an obligation to avoid recognizing foreign judgments that run against
Commission decisions related to articles 101 and 102 TFEU can be inferred
from the principle of primacy of EU law and Regulation 1/2003.133
126 Enron (n 46) [150]. See also section IIIA above; Danov (n 13) 124–27.
127 Case 38/98 Renault v Maxicar [2000] ECR I–2973. Danov (n 13) 192–95.
128 Case C–344/98 Masterfoods v HB Ice Cream [2000] ECR I–11369, para 38. See also
Hasselblad v Orbinson [1985] QB 475 (CA) 504; Iberian UK v BPB Industries [1997] EuLR 1
(ChD) 16. See further, Kerse and Khan (n 103) 298.
129 Case C–234/89 Delimitis [1991] ECR I–935. 130 Masterfoods (n 128) para 49.
131 ibid paras 51, 52; Interpreneur Pub Company v Crehan [2006] UKHL 38, [2006] 3 WLR
148 (HL) [64]–[66].
132 CompareHoffmann (n 124); Case C–78/95Hendrickman v Magenta Druck & Verlag [1996]
ECR I–4943. 133 See also Komninos (n 27); Danov (n 13) 200–04.
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Difficulties may arise, however, with regard to decisions taken by NCAs
because article 16 of Regulation 1/2003 makes no reference to decisions
rendered by an NCA. Nonetheless, the existence of an OFT decision that
would be enforceable in England could suggest that the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment that was in conflict with an OFT decision
would lead to irreconcilable decisions having incompatible consequences on
the same subject matter and between the same parties in the same jurisdiction.
Hence, there are strong arguments suggesting that an English court should be
entitled to hold that it is against English public policy to recognize a foreign
decision that is irreconcilable with an OFT decision, within the strict limits of
Crehan.134 If such an OFT decision were not before the adjudicating court, it
would have to be viewed as persuasive prima facie evidence that the court with
original jurisdiction misapplied EU competition law.135 Such a conclusion
would be in line with the White Paper on damages, in which the Commission
has proposed a rule to the effect that national courts cannot take decisions
running counter to an NCA decision finding an EU competition law
infringement.136 In view of that, it could be argued that the English courts
can refuse recognition of foreign judgments that run against infringement
decisions taken by the OFT.
Although such a deduction would be consistent with the powers of the
English courts in respect to foreign judgments that are in conflict with
Commission decisions related to articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the answer to the
question whether the English courts can refuse the recognition of a judgment
that is in conflict with a decision of the OFT is far from certain. In spite of the
fact that the English courts may have an obligation to avoid recognizing
foreign judgments that run against Commission decisions related to articles
101 and 102 TFEU, the same result does not necessarily follow if the
infringement decision is taken by one of the many NCAs. Indeed, difficulties
are bound to arise because, as already mentioned, a decision taken by an NCA
that was not reviewed by a court with full jurisdiction could raise concerns as
to whether the right to a fair trial of an infringing undertaking was not
undermined in the administrative proceedings.137 Moreover, Crehan138 leaves
no doubt that the principle of judicial independence is an important factor that
needs to be taken into account. Therefore, the issue of whether (and to what
extent) a recognizing court would be entitled to refuse recognition of a
judgment that is in conflict with the decision of an NCA would have to be
carefully considered during the course of the Brussels I review as well as in the
context of the EU competition law legislative initiative.
134 Crehan (n 131). 135 ibid [69]. See also Danov (n 13) 195–200.
136 Commission (EC), Damages Actions (n 39) para 2.3. 137 Wils (n 40) 89.
138 Crehan (n 131).
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VI. THE WAY FORWARD—SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are strong arguments indicating that Brussels I and the Evidence
Regulation could be applicable to cross-border competition law proceedings
before an NCA located in one Member State and private EU competition law
proceedings before another Member State court. Furthermore, a decision
(or part of a decision) of a Member State competition authority that establishes
an infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU should be within the scope of
Brussels I.139 This broader interpretation would be in line with article 1 of
Brussels I, which seems to suggest that ‘judgments given in a [Member] State
in civil commercial matters by . . . administrative tribunals must be recognized
and enforced in the other [Member] States’.140 A broader interpretation of
article 32 of Brussels I would lead to uniform results as to the recognition and
enforcement of all NCAs’ decisions under Brussels I. The importance of the
broader interpretation of article 32 of Brussels I in the context of cross-border
EU competition law actions was acknowledged by the EU legislator in the
White Paper on damages.141 Indeed, the fact that article 34(1) and (2) of
Brussels I would allow for a national court to refuse the recognition of a
decision taken by an NCA that does not respect due process rules in its
adoption may be seen as yet another argument suggesting that a final decision
(or part of a final decision) of an NCA that establishes an infringement of
articles 101 and 102 TFEU should be within the scope of Brussels I.
However, articles 27 and 28 of Brussels I would not be adequate to deal with
the problems that would arise in EU competition law proceedings before an
NCA located in one Member State and private EU antitrust law proceedings
related to the same infringement in another Member State. There are two main
concerns that should be addressed in this context. First, it would be advisable
to clarify that all NCAs, being ‘specialised competition authorit[ies] having
judicial characteristics’,142 should be regarded as ‘courts’ for the purposes of
articles 27 and 28 of Brussels I as long as they are bodies exercising judicial
functions in civil and commercial matters. Therefore, it seems that proceedings
in which NCAs seek to determine whether an undertaking, or undertakings,
have committed an infringement of articles 101 and 102 TFEU should be
within the scope of Brussels I. This would serve to avoid the risk of
irreconcilable decisions rendered on the same antitrust issue in two different
Member States by different bodies (an NCA and a court) that are responsible
for EU competition law enforcement.
Secondly, the assumption in articles 27 and 28 is that the court first seised is
always more appropriate.143 However, it may often be the case that the court
first seised is not well placed to hear and determine an EU competition law case
139 Eurocontrol (n 15) para 4.
140 Jenard Report (n 30) 42. See also Schlosser Report (n 30) para 23.
141 Commission (EC), Damages Actions (n 39) para 2.3.
142 Synetairismos (n 29) Opinion of AG Jacobs, para 45. 143 Danov (n 13) 119–39.
52 International and Comparative Law Quarterly
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 12 Nov 2013 IP address: 134.83.1.243
because an anti-competitive agreement or practice that has been implemented
in a number of Member States does not affect the market in the Member State
where the action is brought. It is unfortunate that jurisdiction in such cases
would depend on the question of who is faster in lodging his claim. A more
satisfactory result could be reached if the court (or NCA) first seised was
entitled to stay their proceedings, or decline jurisdiction, in cases where the
agreement or practice has no substantial direct effects (whether actual or
foreseeable) on competition within the Member State and where another court
(or NCA) was better placed to deal with the case.144 Such an approach would
be better suited to deal with the difficulties that could arise in EU competition
law proceedings before an NCA located in one Member State and private
proceedings related to the same infringement of article 101 and/or article 102
before another Member State court. More specifically, in some cases the
national courts may be better suited than the Member States’ NCAs to establish
an infringement of EU competition law. This can be justified by pointing out
that national courts would be able to establish if there were an infringement of
articles 101 and 102 TFEU, as well as awarding damages145 to rectify the harm
caused by the breach of EU competition law.146 In other cases, the various
leniency programmes adopted by the Member States competition authorities147
may be seen as a strong factor suggesting that in some cases an NCA might
decide not to stay their proceedings (or decline jurisdiction). It could be argued
that in some cases the competition authorities leniency programmes would
provide stronger incentives for infringing undertakings to cooperate in order
for a breach of EU competition law to be established, so that an English court
might decide to stay its proceedings and await the decision of a foreign NCA,
which might be better placed to deal with the case.
Given the fact that in the new Proposal for a Regulation on Jurisdiction and
the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments148 there is no indication that
special jurisdictional bases for competition law actions in the successor to
Regulation 44/2001 are on the agenda, another possibility for a reform might
be setting up a new and special Regulation to be applicable with regard to EU
competition law claims only. Although it is justifiable to employ private
international law when allocating jurisdiction and identifying the applicable
law in cross-border private EU competition law actions brought against
defendants who are not domiciled in a Member State, it might be questioned
whether the EU should use the current EU private international law framework
with regard to EU competition law brought in the European context. Indeed,
setting up a new EU law on civil procedure with regard to EU competition law
claims may be justifiable in view of the fact that articles 101 and 102 TFEU,
144 Compare the European approach in respect of allocation of cases between the NCAs. See the
Commission Notice (n 4) para 8. See further Danov (n 13) 281–83.
145 Commission StaffWorking Paper (n 85) para 8.
146 Basedow (n 86) 1–2; Komninos (n 27) 7–8. 147 See Boge (n 90) 218.
148 COM(2010) 748 final.
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which form part of each Member State’s legal order, are at the heart of an EU
competition law claim, and that specific issues arise in the context of cross-
border enforcement before Member State courts and NCAs. In other words, the
EU legislator may wish to consider whether the European Union should use the
current EU private international law framework with regard to cross-border EU
competition law claims brought by private parties or whether the EU legislator
should rather set up a Special Regulation dealing with EU competition law
proceedings arising in the European context.149
In theory, a Special Regulation could provide for allocation of cases, which
would ensure that a well-placed court would be entitled to deal with an EU
competition law claim—something that is not done under the current version
of Brussels I. This is particularly important in view of the fact that an EU
competition law infringement would normally affect small and medium-sized
businesses and consumers in several countries, who might bring parallel
antitrust proceedings in different Member States. This would contribute to
closer judicial cooperation by Member State courts in private claims based
on breach of articles 101 and 102 TFEU, which would improve the daily
life of consumers and businesses throughout the EU. Furthermore, avoiding
such parallel proceedings would further promote the coherent and uniform
application of EU competition law rules.
Moreover, a Special Regulation could adequately deal with the problem of
the application of EU competition law in proceedings before an NCA located
in one Member State and private EU antitrust law proceedings related to
the same breaches of article 101 and/or article 102 TFEU before a court in
another Member State. In this context, a Special Regulation could uphold the
independence of Member State courts in relation to NCAs, safeguarding the
defendant’s right to a fair trial and hearing.
Finally, such a Special Regulation could go a step further and guarantee the
abolition of the exequatur with regard to judgments in relation to articles 101
and 102 TFEU by envisaging a possibility for the parties to make an appeal on
a point of EU competition law directly before the General Court. This would
provide for uniform application of EU law throughout the EU by generating a
growing body of EU case law in the field of private EU antitrust law
enforcement.
149 The author is currently coordinating a research project funded by the European Commission
Civil Justice Programme (JLS/2009/JCIV/AG/0034-30-CE-0350182/00-68). The funded project
aims to consider answers to the above questions.
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